who want their findings accepted as the proper basis for policy measures engage in a lot of lobbying-like footwork in the corridors of political power. All this also means a 'politicisation' of science. The importance of finding a 'valid' scientific base for action propels political actors to seek ways of 'steering' scientific research towards valued political ends (see, e.g., Jasanoff 1990; Lee 1993). As a consequence, the boundaries between scientifically validated facts and politically accepted opinions are blurred.
Research on the role of scientists and of knowledge in environmental and resource management has produced two lines of argument. Institutionalists view policy-makers as rational actors involved in political bargaining to further their interests and objectives. Knowledge is just one among other inputs into the bargain, providing supportive arguments to political actors with rather stable interests. Institutional factors that promote or block the choice of knowledge to support certain alternative courses of action are particularly important. Others argue that consensual knowledge is what actually shapes the environmental and resource management 'regime' and its patterns of action by moulding the interests of the actors (Haas 1993:183 ff.). Epistemic communities, i.e., networks of researchers and experts are able to wield political power by cognitive authority based on commonly accepted knowledge. These communities become vehicles for institutional learning that, in turn, influences the content of ecological governance (Haas 1997:200, 205 f.) .
Speaking truth to power; access, validation and acceptance of scientific arguments
These two views of the relationship between science and politics point out several aspects influencing the possibilities of ecologically rational governance to achieve both sustainability and autonomy. Scientifically validated knowledge about what promotes sustainability is increasingly crucial to such governance. But the growing complexity of environmental problems means that the process of obtaining knowledge, and of processing and validating it, creates a need to organise knowledge production, assessment and diffusion.
First, by whom should this knowledge be generated and validated, i.e., accepted as common ground for ecological politics? Most often, developed industrial nations see this as a matter for scientists and experts, working in research institutions, and not a task for lay people relying on practical experience (see however, Olsson and Folke 2001) . The underlying idea is that specialisation and professional skill will lead to a reliable and valid base for policy measures. Second, how should knowledge be produced and evaluated? Ideally, the research process should not be directed by politics or special interests. Researchers should be unhindered to seek results in scientifically accepted ways. Otherwise, science might not be speaking truth reliably to power.
But even if science speaks the truth, what knowledge should be produced and validated? At one stage in the process, the answer may be that we need validated knowledge on the actual relationships between causes and effects of specific environmental problems. This presumes that there is some consensus as to which environmental problems are the most critical ones. At a later stage, priority may have to be given to specific courses of action, i.e., practicable solutions to environmental problems. Ideally, this prioritisation should have access to scientific evidence about the scope and seriousness of specific environmental problems and their effects, in order to widen political judgement and make it more probable that political action is directed towards the most relevant targets. Obviously, different kinds of knowledge are required to solve problems of sustainable development. The argument that research on sustainability should be less curiositydriven and more problem-driven leads to a re-evaluation of scientific standards with respect to 'tolerable' uncertainties (see, e.g., Board for Sustainable Development of the National Research Council 1999).
Ideals are one thing, however, and reality another. On all these three aspects, the lines between science and politics do get blurred, with quite distinctive consequences for the possibilities of achieving both sustainability and autonomy. Scientists fight publicly over method; the how of knowledge production and assessment is judged by criteria that differ among disciplines or schools. They proceed from differing assumptions and perspectives, which makes the prioritisation about what and by whom even more complicated for political decision-makers (see Holling et al. 2000:344 ff.) . Since scientific arguments are not always transparent to policy-makers, this increases the possibility of influence from science over decisions about research priorities.
Problems of scale also come in here. Sustainable development largely focuses on global issues and global problems whereas political decision-making structures and the systems of knowledge generation are nationally organised.
Ecocracy vs. democracy; the normative dimension
We thus end up with starkly normative questions about the proper role of science in the policy process. Too much science tends to withdraw policy-making from popular control, thus blurring the lines of accountability. Too much politics in science may threaten the validity of research results, as the research process becomes impregnated with assumptions not derivable from theoretically defendable premises. Thus, while the need to achieve sustainable development makes it necessary to base political decisions on the best possible scientific knowledge, democratic norms force us to find ways of balancing politics and science. How should a system of ecological governance be designed to make sure that ecologically relevant scientific knowledge is brought to bear on issues related to sustainability, and still allow for democratic accountability of public decision-makers?
Some are clearly in favour of tipping the balance towards the scientific end of the scale. Eco-authoritarians contend that the pace of ecological degradation is rapidly threatening the ecological survival of society. This leads them to argue that democracy may be counterproductive to securing that objective. Invoking the authority of science, they claim this to be an 'objective' definition of the sustainability problem. Science can provide the appropriate technical solutions. The resolution to the overriding problem of scarcity is an oligarchic system '. . . with only those possessing the ecological and other competencies necessary to make prudent decisions allowed full participation in the political process.' (Ophuls 1977:163) .
However, decisions on the best way to reach an ecologically rational relation between society and the natural environment 'will affect more lives (private and collective, present and future), and to a greater extent than, arguably, any other policy area', with the exception of war (Barry 1999:199) . Those tipping the scale towards the democratic side argue that scientific knowledge is necessary and useful. However, the scale and possible consequences of ecological governance are so comprehensive as to demand that the demos as a whole, or its representatives, must have the last word. Democratic politics should determine what are the problems involved in sustainability, and decide on the appropriate solutions: 'Once these major issues have been democratically decided, then technical considerations may be appropriate. Experts ought to be "on tap, not on top" . . . ' (Barry 1999:199 ff.) .
Criteria for knowledge-based and democratic ecological governance
But how should that tap be construed to ascertain that 'the application of science is within rather than beyond democratic regulation' (Barry 1999:203) ? How are we to make sure that the answers to what, how and by whom are based on the best possible knowledge available and, as far as possible, on complementary and competing views on problems and solutions? First of all, it seems important that the question of what should be subjected to scientific research and production of knowledge is answered through an intricate balancing of scientific, political and social aspects. Scientific discoveries and findings concerning the society-environment metabolism can be used to address issues of the scope, intensity and direction of 'problems' related to sustainability. An institutionalised dialogue between science and politics can then guide political decisions on how to allocate public funding for future research. This is particularly important for a small country like Sweden with limited resources in terms of both money and manpower.
However, both second-generation environmental and -in particular -sustainability issues involve uncertainties and risks of an unprecedented order. Citizens and actors in civil society can never fully avoid being exposed to these uncertainties and risks. On grounds of autonomy, the evaluation of risks and uncertainties should not be left to policy-makers and scientists alone. This 'post-normal' situation has been used to argue for a more conscious involvement of citizens and a different role for civil society in the production of problem-oriented knowledge (Funtowicz and Ravetz 1993) .
Thus, the issues of how and by whom what knowledge should be generated and assessed ought to be addressed by securing a structure of autonomous and semi-autonomous institutions that gather, assess and then disseminate knowledge on sustainable resource management to political decision-making bodies and to the general public. This may involve university departments, independent research and monitoring institutes. It may also involve agencies that work much like the semi-autonomous institutions presently found in the judicial and -to an increasing extentfinancial spheres. For such a pluralistic structure of scientific activity to provide complementary and competing knowledge, it is of course necessary that the answers to the question of what are such that competition is enhanced by the system of funding. Norms of democracy and autonomy mean that there should also be institutions where scientific knowledge on the state of the environment, and on resource use alternatives and their effects, can be politically evaluated and judged. Such institutions, be they parliamentary commissions, judicial boards of appeal, public hearings or other devices for participation, must be easily accessible for the actors and interests wanting to influence or challenge resourcerelated decisions.
With regard to the knowledge aspect, the following criteria for ecologically rational governance may thus be formulated:
• Governance is ecologically rational to the extent that the structures built up to develop, assess and disseminate science-based knowledge allow for free exchange of complementary and competing views. • Governance is ecologically rational when competing knowledge is made accessible to public debate and scrutiny in the policy process.
• Governance is ecologically rational to the extent that scientific knowledge is brought to bear on, and to interact with, political judgement to arrive at democratically legitimate decisions on how to use and manage natural resources to achieve sustainable development. (Lundqvist 1996:285 ff.) .
Organising knowledge for sustainable resource governance
This linkage between policy and science corresponded to the then dominant view of the society-environment relationship. Environmental problems were seen as linked to media (air, water, soil), and/or to their sectors 'of origin' (agriculture, transport, large resource-based industry, etc.). They were mainly discussed in natural science and technical terms, and could be 'solved' one by one with the right facts and the right techniques. A broader view, including perspectives on the society-environment relationship prevalent in social science and the humanities, was mainly missing. Not until the late 1980s was a specific Research Committee on Society and the Environment set up within the SEPA research structure. Its share of the environment research budget remained infinitesimal, however, and the committee was early on restructured to reflect the views of different organised interests.
The problems inherent in this organisation of the sciencepolicy relationship became increasingly apparent by the 1990s, as the broader views of sustainable development and the more diffuse character of second-generation problems got to the top of the environmental agenda. A special environmental research commission recommended a broader, more problem-oriented perspective and more co-ordination among different users of research than the prevailing 'environmental' and 'cause-effect' research structure dominated by the SEPA (SOU 1992:68, pp. 108 ff.; Cabinet Bill 1992/93:170, p. 513) .
Science for markets; solution-oriented research to develop green technology By then, environmental research was drawn into political turmoil. Upon winning the 1991 elections, one of new Bourgeois Government's first, and certainly most well advertised priorities was to dissolve the so-called Wage Earners' Funds (Cabinet Bill 1991/92:92) . Somewhat reluctantly, the Social-Democratic Government established these funds within a year after regaining power in 1982, after years of intensive ideological debate. Part of the profit generated by Swedish business was to be placed in these employee-controlled funds. Over the years, the share of employee ownership and control over Swedish business would thus gradually increase. In its 1993 Cabinet Bill on 'frontline research' the Centre-Right Coalition proposed that part of the funds should be used for long-term knowledge expansion though basic research and recruitment of scholars in areas of crucial importance to Sweden's future competitiveness in a global economy. This included, among other things, strategic environmental research. The strategic component meant that there should be more research on new solutions, such as resource-lean technologies (Cabinet Bill 1992/93:171, passim) .
The 1992/93 Research Bill developed these ideas further. The Bourgeois Government then in power proposed that the SEK 20 billion to be released for research through the dissolution of Wage Earners' Funds should be given to a few large 'research foundations'. Working for a period of about 15 years, these foundations should provide the best possible conditions for strong research milieus by concentrating their funding to broad but well-defined programmes. The drive for research to provide new solutions is evident. Said the Minister: 'It is of national importance to ensure that Swedish industry has access to an infrastructure of basic and applied research that enables it to conquer new markets.' (Cabinet Bill 1992/93:170, p. 35) .
One of the new foundations would address strategic environmental research. This foundation, called MISTRA, was charged with using the interest on SEK 2.5 billion to support research that 'can be swiftly developed into practices of importance to the environment'. The MISTRA Board should be 'clearly anchored' in both the scientific community and Swedish industry (Cabinet Bill 1992/93:170, p. 38) . Evidently, the Cabinet had in mind to break new paths for Swedish environmental research. What this meant to the traditional, discipline-bound cause-effect research is discussed below (see pp. 97-9).
MISTRA's historic record and present activities reveal a deliberate and continuous effort to bridge the gap between the scientific community and a broad spectrum of potential users of research results. To receive MISTRA funding, environmental research programmes must be driven not only by the scientific community's urge to be 'at the cutting edge of knowledge'. They must address the need to solve real world environmental problems. Such solutions should include environmentally sound products, services and processes that can make it in a market, as well as new judicial, administrative and other political measures. Fundable MISTRA programs should
• provide users in enterprises, authorities and organisations, as well as international negotiators, decision-makers on different levels and interest groups, with the latest scientific findings, irrespective of sectoral boundaries; • provide the research community with problems as they have been formulated by the problem owners/users, irrespective of its disciplinary boundaries.
Also the enumeration of the different actors and interests that might get funded through MISTRA evidences this drive to bring scientific research and socio-economic practice together, in order both to solve environmental problems and bring about new technological development. The foundation's homepage states that 'MISTRA is for
• researchers who want to tackle problems, the solutions to which can forward the development towards a sustainable society; • Swedish companies who want to be at the cutting edge when it comes to developing environmentally sound products, services or production processes. Scientific and commercial perspectives must be combined; • authorities and legislators who wish to tighten the requirements on activities that may harm the environment. Tougher requirements must be based on solid scientific foundations; • international negotiators charged with the task of drawing up international agreements on more stringent environmental requirements. A MISTRA programme must be able to meet both the demands of the international research community for quality and the need of negotiators for accurate information; • non-governmental organisations and others striving for sustainable development.' (www.mistra-research.se/).
Programmes that fulfil these requirements, and pass the needle's eye of an extensive international peer review of scientific quality, usually get funded for two consecutive three to four year periods. Executive committees lead the programmes and are mandated to keep the programme's focus on problem solving and the practical implementation of research. The MISTRA secretariat is also quite active, checking each programme throughout its duration, e.g., by meeting representatives of each programme several times a year. About 20 programmes were running by the end of 2001, and the sum available for annual funding from MISTRA amounts to SEK 250 million (www.mistra-research.se/).
Since the mid-1990s, MISTRA has provided grants to Swedish environment-and resource-related research in the neighbourhood of SEK 1.2 billion (about €130 million). What has this comparatively rich funding meant so far for the role of knowledge in ecological governance? First of all, it has profoundly influenced the how and by whom of Swedish environmental research. Due to the thorough review of programme proposals, and the continuous evaluation of programme performance, scientific quality is kept at a high level. The MISTRA approach has also caused a dramatic increase in cross-disciplinary environment-related research; natural sciences, technology, and the social sciences have been forced to team up to get funded for research on different aspects of a common problem.
At issue, however, is the question of what is affected (and, one might add, the question of for whom). The MISTRA Board of Governors decides which programmes should be funded, often after active scanning and development of ideas through the MISTRA staff. The MISTRA and other strategic research foundations are deliberately made constitutionally sovereign in interpreting their statutes on how to spend their funds. The large sums allocated to research might thus not necessarily be in tandem with the priorities made in the Parliament's research policy decisions. The mandate to promote eco-technological developments in Swedish industry may further accentuate this. Another issue concerns who should own the research results. Should it be MISTRA as a foundation under private law? Or should it be those exploiting research results by developing new technologies, or other groups involved in the practical solution of environmental problems? The issue of government's role in ecological governance with respect to the knowledge dimension soon came to occupy centre stage in the political debate.
For government's sake; the political fight to control strategic environmental research
To the Social-Democratic government returning to power after the 1994 elections, the strategic research foundations were an aberration in research policy. The foundations' voluminous budgets, their independent status relative to the government, and their strategies for research and development had drawn heavy criticism. The Social Democrats were furthermore haunted by the repercussions of the acute economic crisis of 1992, and the continuously huge budget deficit. All this combined to promote an orchestrated attack on the strategic foundations, where environmental research in particular came to occupy centre stage.
In its drive to balance the state budget, the Social-Democratic Government in September 1996 ordered the SEPA to cut its budget by SEK 230 million in 1998-99. Searching for alternatives, the SEPA leadership suggested taking away the agency's whole research budget. This alternative was put forward because the SEPA leadership seemingly nursed the view that MISTRA would open its chest and fully compensate the SEPA for the cuts in the research budget. However, it was not clear whether the Social-Democratic Government and the Environment Minister actually shared this view (Esselin and Arvidsson 1998:12 ff.).
The SEPA Director General (who incidentally was at the same time Chairman of the MISTRA Board of Directors) counted on the Cabinet to gain a political majority for opening the strategic research foundations to governmental influence and control. A 1996 bill proposed that the Cabinet should have the right to change the statutes of the foundations from 1997. This would circumvent earlier regulations demanding that such changes be preceded by a formal request from the foundation board (Cabinet Bill 1996/97:22, p. 4) . Furthermore, the Cabinet's research bill proposed that the Cabinet should have the prerogative to appoint and fire the members of the foundation boards. This would also concern members representing the scientific community, who should no longer be voted in by a special electoral collegium. The Cabinet argued that this was motivated by the need to co-ordinate scientific activities to research policy objectives, to free resources for use elsewhere, and simply to cut the budget deficit (Cabinet Bill 1996/97:5, p. 45 f.) Obviously, the Social-Democratic cabinet saw these proposals as a way of getting the foundation boards to allocate money not just to peer-reviewed research programmes but also to state agencies and councils supporting environmental research.
The changes in the statutes and the processes of appointing board members were accepted by the Parliament after intense debate (Esselin and Arvidsson 1998:15 f.). The 1997 Budget Bill cut the SEPA's research budget for 1997 by one third, and allocated no research money for 1998 and 1999. There was a clear ambition to compensate SEPA with money from MISTRA, so that SEPA could fulfil its responsibility for co-ordinating and evaluating Swedish environmental research (Cabinet Bills 1996/97:1/20, pp. 5, 22; 1996/97:5, p. 303 f.) . However, the Social-Democratic victory turned out to be of no consequence. The MISTRA Board's Position Paper presented by mid-1997 made it strikingly clear that the foundation would not grant money to the research traditionally supported by the SEPA. Indeed, MISTRA emphasised that it would continue to concentrate on broad, interdisciplinary, and above all, solution-oriented programmes to enhance Sweden's possibilities to capture greater shares of the growing eco-technology market (MISTRA 1997:16 ff.) .
The efforts to gain governmental control over appointments to the boards of strategic research foundations were thus parliamentarily successful. However, the formal changes did not translate into changes in the directions of funding. The MISTRA board rejected state involvement in decisions on what research should be sponsored by MISTRA. Given the bleak prospects for future funding of SEPA-sponsored research, it thus seemed as if the SEPA had lost most of its former control of the research agenda and access to research results. Furthermore, the question of what environment-related research to support seemed to be tipping towards an emphasis on 'marketable' technological solutions to sustainability problems.
Balancing the scale: towards a multi-faceted relationship between science, politics and market actors
Soon, however, proposals for comprehensive changes in the system of research funding were put on the agenda. The 'Research 2000' Commission report released in October 1998 proposed to co-ordinate and consolidate the funding of basic, applied and sectoral research into four research councils. The final proposal presented in the Social-Democratic Cabinet Bill on research in March 2000 contained a mix of funding bodies and some interesting arguments for such a mix.
The purpose was to create a new funding organisation to enable 'concentrated efforts in important fields of scientific research, promote co-operation between research and development, and improve the diffusion of scientific knowledge'. This organisation should make it possible for Cabinet and Parliament to answer the question of what by directing research to 'important' fields of both basic and applied research, and to stimulate high quality research co-operation across disciplines. One large national Science Council, established through a conglomeration of the earlier, more specialised councils would now fund basic research. With respect to applied research, two new research councils would be set up, also on the basis of existing units. To secure a proper answer to the question of how, the scientific community would be provided with a legally guaranteed majority on the boards of the new funding councils. Furthermore, a special funding agency would be established to help develop research results into inventions and new technologies (Cabinet Bill 1999 / 2000 .
What, then, about research for an ecologically sustainable development? The Cabinet saw this as a highly prioritised field, in need of a strong base for concentrated, long-term research efforts involving not only research in natural science and technology, but also on social, cultural and economic aspects. One of the proposed new research councils should therefore fund research in the fields of environment, agriculture and forestry, as well as planning, building and housing. This meant taking over responsibilities from four earlier Research Councils and most of the traditional environmental research earlier funded by the SEPA. In one stroke, the Cabinet thus put an enormously broad spectrum of ecologically relevant research within one administrative framework. It funds research spanning all the way from molecular biology to comprehensive infra-structural planning. The Cabinet's major argument for this reorganisation was that since 'the organisation of society and our lifestyles are the ultimate causes of environmental problems, we must understand and change the underlying economic, political and social mechanisms in order to solve these problems ' (Cabinet Bill 1999 /2000 .
The new Research Council for Environment, Agricultural Sciences and Spatial Planning -(FORMAS) -began its activities in the second half of the year 2000. The Cabinet's priorities as to the what and how of research within FORMAS's area of responsibility reflect efforts to carefully balance all the multi-faceted demands made on research for sustainable development. Charged with initiating and co-ordinating research of importance to the society's transition to 'Sustainable Sweden', FORMAS is to give priority to research on positive and negative relations among ecologically, economically and socially sustainable development. But it should also fund research that contributes to the achievement of sectoral development goals, and leads to increased competitiveness in agriculture and forestry and industries within those sectors, particularly the development of agricultural products not harmful to consumers.
The same concern for an appropriate balance of competing demands is evident with respect to how research should be carried out. FORMAS should spur multi-and cross-disciplinary research for sustainable development by supporting concentrated Swedish activities in prioritised areas and by enhancing international research co-operation. FORMAS is also expected to support critical and independent research providing scientifically valid alternatives of action for Swedish agricultural and forestry policies. The new council is to co-operate with other research-funding bodies to make sure crucial problems related to sustainable development do not go unattended. Finally, FORMAS is charged with actively assembling and disseminating research results and accumulated knowledge to different groups and actors in society (Cabinet Bill 2000/01:3, pp. 116 ff.). The division of labour determined by Parliament mandates FORMAS to secure a 'long-term build-up of knowledge' in all the areas within its responsibility, while the SEPA is responsible 'for research directly supporting its own activities.' (Cabinet Bill 1999 /2000 . The SEPA has since embarked upon a strategy of concentrating its research support to so-called 'initiative' areas. The themes are elaborated within the Agency, and then opened up for competition among groups of researchers. The final programme is worked out in co-operation between the researchers, potential users interested in the research, and SEPA officers, to secure quality, relevance and applicability of results The reforms in the last decade of the twentieth century resulted in a quite multi-faceted structure for funding research to sustainable development. At one end, MISTRA can use its annually available SEK 250 million for grants to large-scale programmes involving primarily applied research aimed at solving particular environmental and sustainability problems, all in accordance with priorities made by its Board of Governors and staff. There is little, if any, government intervention with respect to the content of supported programmes. At the other end, the SEPA uses its funds of up to SEK 80 million to support research serving the Agency's mandate to implement policy measures for sustainable development. In the middle, we find the new FORMAS with its scientist-dominated board. FORMAS is expected to use its SEK 400 to 500 million to support not only basic research over the whole spectrum of sustainable development problems, but also research that could support public policy measures as well as strengthen the future competitiveness of sectors dependent on renewable natural resources.
There have been signs that the new research council FORMAS has tried to co-ordinate answers the questions of what knowledge should be sought, particularly in the field of climate change (www.formas.se). At the same time, MISTRA's strong financial independence means that the MISTRA Board can determine much of the answer simply by announcing new priorities for funding (MISTRA did so by the end of 2002 in the field of climate change. Research; see http://www.mistra-research.se). That came one year after the SEPA was funding a large research programme on the same topic (www.naturvardsverket.se). By the end of 2002, Sweden thus had three research funding bodies all giving attention to and spending money on climate-related research, each from their particular vantage point. This indicates that the two first criteria set up for the knowledge dimension of ecologically rational governance criterion -scientific competition and accessibility of results for public debate and scrutiny -are now closer to being met than they were before the big organisational shuffle of the 1990s.
Monitoring -providing common knowledge for policy-making and evaluation
A functioning system for continuous monitoring and evaluation is obviously a necessary means to gather knowledge about the state and trends of ecological systems. SEPA became responsible for the programme on measurement and control of environmental quality as early as 1978. Regional and local programmes were set up for water recipient control, covering most of Sweden's freshwater bodies and streams. Regional air quality measurement programmes were established around the largest urban conglomerations (see Lundqvist 1994:1739 ff.). Problems of co-ordination, dissemination and irretrievability soon developed. A 1994 commission report found that more than a dozen public agencies were engaged in data collection, with little exchange of information. Field studies made data collection very costly. Measurement stations were not co-ordinated with one another. No common central environmental database existed. The report emphasised that remote sensing methods should come into more intensive use, and be closely co-ordinated and integrated with the net of datacollecting ground-stations. It suggested a new, more co-ordinated environmental data system to provide the basis for environmental indices (SOU 1994:125, pp. 91 ff., 161 ff.).
Much of the data collected from national, regional, and to some extent local monitoring activities functioned as a database available to all and everyone interested in the environment. The SEPA ran a series called Monitor reporting trends in different environmental pollutants or different parts of the environment. Statistics Sweden and SEPA published (and still do) The Natural Environment in Figures, which gives an overview of global and regional environmental problems, reports on factors influencing the national environment, and contains a lengthy statistical description of the state of the environment in Sweden. Statistics Sweden also runs an information bulletin, presenting annual trends of different pollutants, hazardous products etc.
Later developments reveal an increasing concern with the connection between environmental monitoring and actual decision-making. A 1997 Commission report suggested that the monitoring programme areas set up by the SEPA and its Environment Monitoring Board, and the regional programmes, should in the future be closely connected to the environmental quality norms of the Environmental Code and the coming National Environmental Objectives. Furthermore, future EU directives might call for reconsidering 'relevant' spatial scales of monitoring. The increased costs of expanding monitoring and surveillance should be at least partly covered through payments from sector agencies with explicit NEO responsibilities (SOU 1997:34, pp. 131 ff.). The NEO Commission suggested an elaborate system of nearly 160 indices for the 15 NEOs. The eight national agencies assigned with realising these objectives should have explicitly defined monitoring responsibilities. 
Knowledge at bay -the role of science in key processes of ecological governance
Taking the heat; science, politics and the issue of climate change I said above that governance is ecologically rational when its structures allow for scientific research results and expertise to make complementary and competing knowledge accessible to public debate and judgement in the policy process. The organisation of the science-policy relationship developing in Sweden at the turn of the century covers some distance in satisfying this criterion. Furthermore, I stated that for governance to be ecologically rational, scientific and expert knowledge must be brought to bear on and interact with actual decision-making related to the objective of sustainable development. To shed some light on this aspect, let us look at the actual role of science and expertise in processes of key importance to the achievement of 'Sustainable Sweden'. This will be done by looking at critical cases in three stages of ecological governance; policy formation, policy implementation, and one case of large-scale infra-structural development involving valuable natural resources.
First is the formation of Sweden's policy on climate change. There is profound uncertainty about whether and, if so, when crucial limits will be reached. There are no end-of-pipe solutions. This together with the complex relation between climate change and the energy and transportation systems on which modern societies depend means that climate change really highlights the precarious dependency of politics on science. In 1993, the CentreRight Cabinet then in power appointed a special Climate Change Commission (CCC) under the Ministry of Environment. The CCC consisted of active climate researchers, representatives of agencies and councils supporting climate-related research, as well as officers from central agencies and representatives from Swedish industry. Its mandate was to co-ordinate Swedish climate-related research, give advice to the Cabinet on how to utilise research results in national policy-making and international climate negotiations, co-ordinate Sweden's activities within IPCC, and provide co-ordinated and continuous reporting on climate research (SOU 1994:138, foreword) .
The CCC early on presented overviews of Swedish climate research and its funding. It set about organising national workshops on issues of climate change, and on how to come to grips with the emissions of greenhouse gases. Its 1994 report contains a comprehensive overview of the causes and present trends of global and regional climate change, as well as on the counterstrategies that might be deployed (SOU 1994:138, passim) . The 1995 report developed these themes further, and more specifically concentrated on the global level and the international climate negotiations. The Swedish situation and options in the future negotiations were outlined (SOU 1995:96, passim) .
It seems quite clear that the CCC during its first years enjoyed a highly regarded position within Swedish policy-making on climate change issues. This is to a large degree due to the fact that the CCC chairman was at the same time chairman of the IPCC. He could thus provide Swedish key policy-makers with comprehensive and valuable insights into the ongoing IPCC process, and offer advice on how Sweden should formulate its strategies in the continued negotiations. His international status both as a scholar and as a central IPCC actor furthermore gave him credibility within the Swedish climate research community. From this base, he used the CCC to bring both believers and sceptics among climate-related researchers into the Swedish debate. In the organisational and inter-agency linkages emerging in Sweden 'after the Rio Conference and on the road to Kyoto', the CCC came to be seen as the most important science-related institution (Elzinga and Nolin 1998:22, 53 f.) .
In early 1996, the CCC was reorganised and thereafter located within the SEPA. The following year, the CCC chairman retired from his post in the IPCC. The initiative in Swedish climate policy now shifted from the CCC to the more policy-oriented 'Kyoto group', consisting of climate-specialised representatives of ministries, SEPA and the National Board for Industrial and Technological Development. Meeting twice a month, this group became the focal point of Swedish policy-making on climate change. Whenever there were conflicting views within the group, the issue was moved directly to the Cabinet level for settlement. Scientific and expert knowledge had several inroads to this highly political group. In-house consultation was a way to get updates of knowledge, used particularly by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Use of outside expertise was made frequently by actively seeking out Swedish experts who had done research on specific climaterelated issues. The former CCC chairman was consulted on issues confronting Sweden's negotiating team. Reviewers of the process argue that the focus was all the time on Swedish research; international knowledge came in mainly via Swedish scientists (Elzinga and Nolin 1998:62) .
The inter-organisational structure of the Kyoto group was thus quite different from the highly intra-ministerial one found in the issue of allocating LIP funds (see above, pp. 77-81). The difference in relation to science and expertise is also striking. Admittedly, the climate issue is comprehensive, and has broad implications for Sweden's efforts to achieve sustainable development. But one could easily argue that this is the case also for the LIP programme. And yet, we find that the climate issue seemed to call for close interaction with the scientific community, whereas the sustainability issues involved in the LIPs did not (see below, pp. 107-9).
The CCC was dissolved in 1998. Work on Sweden's future policy towards climate change was then concentrated in the 1998 Climate Commission, a body of politicians and experts charged with developing strategies for achieving the NEO of Limited climate impact. This commission particularly emphasised the need to increase public knowledge on the greenhouse effect and the risks of global warming. However, the basis recommended for better knowledge primarily consisted of improved monitoring and evaluation of policy effects and general climate trends. Nothing in the 'basic action package' explicitly refers to continued or intensified climate research to widen the knowledge base (SOU 2000:23, pp. 272 ff., 597 ff.).
Meanwhile, the funding of climate-related research turned more action-oriented. As pointed out already (see above, part 4.2.4), the MISTRA foundation by the end of 2002 increased its activities in this field, actively seeking cross-disciplinary programmes involving also the social sciences. With research money again flowing in, the SEPA initiated a specific research initiative on climate policy instrumentation in 2001. Furthermore, the new FORMAS research council is developing further climate-related research activities funded by its predecessors. Finally, Swedish climate researchers have long been actively engaged in co-operative programmes at the European level (see Elzinga and Nolin 1998:27 ff.).
Thus, the Swedish research community and funding agencies seem to be taking the issue of global warming and its threat to sustainability quite seriously. What remains to be seen, however, is the extent to which Sweden's future climate policy will rely on such knowledge. Since the release of its report, the Climate Commission has taken much heated criticism for its views on what constitutes the proper basis for elevating citizen knowledge and awareness, and on the role of citizens as passive receivers of information.
Paying LIP service to knowledge; the limited role of expertise in Local Investment Plans for sustainable development
Let us then turn to the implementation of what I above labelled a flagship of Sweden's efforts to achieve a 'sustainable society', i.e., the large 1998-2004 programme of subsidies to local investment programmes for sustainable development (see above, pp. 78-81). The Cabinet put much political prestige into the LIP programme and thus set up a new, quite unorthodox structure and process for handling the LIPs. The Ministry of Environment established a Unit for Ecological Transformation and Development (here called MENUET) to process LIP applications. The Unit consisted of a dozen officials and was mandated to use 'whatever sectoral agency competence and expertise was needed' (Cabinet Budget Bill 1997/98:1, Spending Area 18, p. 46).
Central and regional expert agencies implementing environmental and natural resource policies were told by the Environment Minister that they would have a prominent role in the LIP process (Auditors of Parliament 1998/99:37). However, the Cabinet's designation of expert agencies to assist the MENUET and the municipalities in evaluating the sustainability aspects of locally suggested measures came only just before the deadline for final applications. The Regional Administrations (RA, länsstyrelserna) were linked to the process by a rule making it mandatory for local governments to seek RA counsel when applying for LIP grants (Auditors of Parliament 1998/99:38, 45).
The actual decision-making process differed very much from formal regulations. The application and evaluation process in the first programme year stretched over a period of only six months. During the first four months, 286 municipal notifications of interest were processed, and about 40 municipalities were selected for further dialogue with the MENUET. In the last two months, the 12 MENUET officials took decisions on 115 final applications and selected 42 municipalities. The designated expert agencies never really became part of the innermost network of actors. They were asked only to comment on individual 'measures' in the municipal notifications of interest according to a MENUET checklist, and could thus never provide overall expert assessments on the applications. Indeed, very few expert comments were sought. The three most knowledgeable expert agencies commented on no more than 26 of the 460 'measures' in the 42 LIPs finally receiving grants (Standing Committee on Housing 1998/99:URD1, p. 23 ff.).
The usual procedures for expert consultation thus did not work in this process. Very few measures were ever remitted to the expert agencies, and their comments were mostly not considered by the MENUET. The very limited role for the SEPA further reflects this demise of knowledge and expertise. Its so-called 'favourable' position only meant that a SEPA official could 'sit in' to provide support during the MENUET's initial scanning of municipal notifications selected for further dialogue (Auditors of Parliament 1998/99:37 ff., 77).
The expert role of Regional Administrations in the LIP process became totally blurred. Because the LIP Ordinance was too unclear, they could not provide answers to municipalities about which measures might be eligible for grants. Furthermore, they were unable to give adequate advice to the MENUET, because they were not let into the crucial 'dialogue' between the MENUET and selected municipalities. Neither could they assist municipalities not receiving grants, since they had no insight into the Unit's criteria, priorities and arguments (Standing Committee on Housing 1998/99:URD1, pp. 26 ff.). A majority of the 115 local governments making final applications in the first programme year said they met with changing or contradictory demands and guidelines from the MENUET on the proper content of the application. One third of the 115 MGs finally applying for grants actually doubted whether MENUET had enough competence or knowledge of the functioning of local government to really understand their problems with LIP applications.
The massive critique against this process did lead to some changes in the second LIP round of 1998-99. The agencies now had experts sitting in with the MENUET once or several times a week. Furthermore, some agencies' views were now sought both before and after the final applications were in. However, there remained a crucial question: Were the officials individually knowledgeable experts or representatives of their agencies (Auditors of Parliament 1998/99:40 f.)? Some agencies expressed fears about what might happen to the authority of agencies and RAs in ordinary planning and regulation, if or when municipal governments found that the MENUET was playing political games by 'facilitating or accommodating' municipal measures deemed inappropriate by professional expert standards (Auditors of Parliament 1998/99:42).
Expert knowledge was thus given secondary importance in the LIP process. By defining sustainable development as a crosssectoral issue, the Cabinet downplayed the role of expert knowledge and obfuscated the status of the agencies representing such knowledge. The vagueness of the Ordinance's criteria for judgement on what measures in the LIPs were sustainabilityoriented enough to be eligible for grants added to the uncertainty about the role of expert knowledge. As one evaluation puts it, the Unit 'did not satisfactorily assess the quality of the information provided in the municipal applications' (National Audit Office 1999b:41 f.).
Tunnelled vision; the role of science and expertise in large-scale infrastructure investments
During the ending decades of the twentieth century, the paradigm of centralised large-scale social engineering came under fire in Sweden. In particular, large-scale infra-structural projects such as nuclear power plants, highways and other facilities to be located in local environments drew fire from ordinary citizens. Increasingly, such development projects were seen as threats to the local environment, local identity, and the continuity of preferred ways of life. A case in point is the renewal of the railroad on the Swedish west coast. Originally a vision promoted by the business elite in the European Round Table, the new doubletrack railway would provide a high-speed link, all the way from Oslo over Gothenburg and Malmö, and then via the new Öresund Bridge to Denmark connecting this region with the European continent. As much as SEK 8 billion would be invested. The Swedish Parliament allocated money for the project in 1991, and construction work began soon thereafter under the auspices of the National Rail Administration (NRA).
In ecological terms, the most crucial part concerned construction of two parallel 8.6 km railway tunnels through the Hallandsås, a rock-sand-clay ridge running between the Halland and Skåne regions. With several features judged of utmost national environmental concern, the area was subjected to severe constraints -protected areas, prohibited resource-related activities -under Swedish natural resource and environmental legislation. This was to be weighted against the economic gain from the tunnel; it would cut 10 to 15 minutes off the travel time between Gothenburg and Malmö, and would cost only about SEK one billion to complete. Most environmental concerns were, however, given less consideration, although the Water Court set some strict conditions concerning the allowable impact on groundwater resources in the ridge (SOU 1998:60, passim) .
It soon turned out, however, that these conditions could not be met. The water leakage in the tunnel widely exceeded all limits, and groundwater levels on the ridge plummeted far below the levels allowed. Evidently, the geological characteristics of the ridge had not been given enough attention. In fact, the NRA flatly neglected already available geo-technical knowledge offered by geological expertise in an energy company that had built a freshwater provision tunnel through the ridge a decade earlier (Falkemark 1998:16) . Looking for methods of stemming this selfinflicted tide, the NRA first wanted the contractors to widen the tunnel to allow for lining. This would, however, lead to forbidding cost increases. Another solution was now sought in the form of some chemical sealant that could be injected into the tunnel to prevent leakage. The alternative chosen was Rhoca-Gil. After some initial investigations and trial injections of this sealant in early 1997, the NRA ordered 360 tons in late June. Injections with Rhoca-Gil were then made until early October 1997, totalling 1,400 tons for 550 metres. By then, several dramatic instances had occurred. Construction workers became severely ill, with symptoms of disturbances in their nervous system. Cattle had to be slaughtered when they became paralysed after drinking from water in the creeks into which excess tunnel water was being pumped.
At this stage, the local government -backed by the National Chemicals Inspectorate and the regional Labour Inspectoratestopped the tunnel work. The toxic effects of Rhoca-Gil -caused by the ingredient acrylamide -were such that all activities must be abandoned. The most interesting thing here is that there existed both knowledge and information about this aspect of the Rhoca-Gil sealant when it was first tried out in the tunnel. Japanese experience indicated toxic effects on those handling the product, and the toxicity was clearly pointed out in the first trials and analyses by the contractor and then conveyed to the NRA. However, this was then tuned down and later evidently more or less neglected in the further handling (Falkemark 1998:36 ff.) . By early summer 2003 the construction of the tunnel was still suspended.
It is evident from the many evaluations made of the tunnel case that the role of expert knowledge was consistently downplayed. This was true for the legal environmental constraints on largescale construction in the ridge area. It was furthermore true for the assessment of the geological characteristics of the ridge. And finally, knowledge seems to have been consciously neglected or downplayed when it came to the possible negative effects on environment and health of the chemical sealant chosen to tighten the tunnel. The explanation offered by the evaluators is simple, and has far-reaching implications for the possibilities of establishing a relation between knowledge and decision-making that is rational in ecological terms. The vision among those responsible for the construction was tunnelled; the economic gains from the highspeed track and the tunnel obviously justified all the environmental and health costs incurred during the construction phase (Falkemark 1998:46 f.; see also Hydén and Baier 1998:36 f.).
Knowledge matters, but politics (and money) counts

Knowledge and sustainability -the volatile role of science in ecological governance
The degree of uncertainty surrounding what is sustainable and how to get onto a path towards sustainable development makes scientifically validated knowledge a necessary part of rational ecological governance. At the same time, the demand for effective decision-making makes for an unclear or uneasy role of scientific knowledge within ecological governance. The quest for reducing uncertainty implies that research results validated by the scientific community should provide the basis for decisions. But since scientific debate often concerns problems of validation, this puts scientific knowledge in somewhat of a veto position vis-á-vis political decision-makers in need of clear cut and reliable recommendations for action. On the other hand, the political demand for effective decision-making may push scientists to come forward with results and recommendations not yet fully meeting the criteria for scientific validation. Policy-makers eager to take action may neglect or downplay scholarly differences of opinion, or lend their ears to certain 'schools' of science, who may then come to dominate in 'speaking truth to power'. In the end, policy-makers then receive advice that is less instrumental for the effective implementation of rational ecological governance.
At least two of the three criteria formulated at the outset of this chapter address this precarious balance between validated scientific knowledge and effective decision-making in ecological governance for sustainability. We consider governance ecologically rational to the extent that the structures for developing, assessing and disseminating science-based knowledge allow for the build-up and exchange of complementary and competing views and arguments, and different bodies of knowledge. Furthermore, governance is ecologically rational when competing knowledge is made accessible to public debate and scrutiny in the policy process.
To what extent does the Swedish science-policy relationship in the realm of sustainable development live up to these criteria? The relationship prevailing in Swedish environmental politics up to the 1990s could be labeled monopsonistic. The Environment Protection Agency was in essence the only funding body, and thus 'buyer', of research related to environmental policy-making. A large part of the SEPA research budget went to areas or themes elaborated and decided upon within the agency itself. Consequently, the major part of environmental research was directed towards helping policy implementation in fields defined by the agency as most in need of improved knowledge.
While such an order of things could be seen as positive in relation to policy-and decision-making within the agency's area of responsibility, it is problematic in three interrelated aspects. First, the concentration of funding to research on narrowly specified environmental problems meant that broader interactive problems went mostly unattended. Given their dependency on one source of grants, the members of the comparatively small environmental research community in Sweden became highly specialised on specific issues. This in turn meant that science-based recommendations for how to tackle the broader issues of sustainable development were difficult to obtain from the research community. The efforts made in the 1990s to bring about broad-based 'Research Programmes for A Better Environment' show that this problem was increasingly realised by SEPA and other researchfunding bodies (see, e.g., SEPA 1996).
By then, however, the situation for environment-related research had become even more volatile. A new and formidable player was moving to centre stage. With its large funds and its mandate to sponsor solution-oriented research and development, MISTRA has the power to bring about cross-disciplinary programmes that address issues crucial to the broader perspectives of governance for sustainable development. Undoubtedly, this has led to a widening of research perspectives and to a more inter-disciplinary profile of Swedish environment-related research. Furthermore, the exchange of differing views on problems, solutions and research priorities is provided with a new arena. On the other hand, while the links between research and governmental policy were quite obvious when SEPA dominated the funding landscape, they now became more obscure. When MISTRA -a private law foundation -makes its research priorities, how do they relate to governmental strategies for sustainable development?
Given that the SEPA was bereft of its research funds while MISTRA flourished, it seemed for a while as if Swedish environ-ment-related research was thrown from one monopsonist situation to another. However, the emergence of the new scientistdominated FORMAS research council, and the revival of SEPA as a research-funding body clearly point towards a more pluralistic situation. More funds are now available for research on issues crucial to ecologically rational governance than ever before. As shown earlier, these three bodies represent a broad spectrum in terms of science/policy dominance. There are now funds available from bodies with different mandates and objectives. The development of large cross-disciplinary programmes means there will be more competing and complementary knowledge, and thus more open scientific exchange on alternatives for ecological governance. One should also take into account the increasing Swedish participation in European research programmes. Circumstances thus seem favourable for both competitive knowledge formation and broader scientific exchange.
When the votes are all in; science, democracy and ecological politics But a most crucial issue remains. Are scientific knowledge and expert advice actually used, and expert advice actually heeded to the extent implied by our criteria for rationally ecological governance? We earlier defined governance as ecologically rational when knowledge and expertise is brought to bear on, and to interact with, political judgement to arrive at democratically legitimate decisions on how to use and manage natural resources to achieve sustainable development. In these carefully balanced words lies a consideration for political autonomy. The collective of citizens in the democratic system should have the last wordthrough their representatives -on how to proceed towards the 'sustainable society', not the scientists or experts. At the same time, democratic representatives have a political responsibility to seek out and make use of the best possible knowledge for decisions on sustainable development.
The way science and expertise have fared in recent, and for the project of 'Sustainable Sweden' quite crucial, decision-making processes, makes the prospects for meeting this criterion seem rather mixed. When Social-Democrats wanted to make a show of their commitment to sustainable development, they seemed to look more to gaining politically from the first round of LIP programmes than to reducing uncertainty about the actual effectiveness and effects of the measures of implementation. The implementation of the first rounds of the LIP programme strongly supports this conclusion. On the very uncertainty-ridden problem of climate change, Swedish policy-makers and international negotiators from the outset worked quite closely with leading Swedish scientists and experts. Although this relationship may have weakened somewhat after 1998, as evidenced by the treatment of science in the Climate Commission's report on Sweden's future climate strategy, efforts are now (spring 2003) underway to strengthen Swedish climate research (see www.mistraresearch.se). Finally, the spectacular tunnel case implies that even in areas strongly protected by environmental and resource legislation, exploitation for large-scale high-technology projects may proceed without due weight being given to knowledge about effects on sustainability.
One might argue that this picture is all too pessimistic. After all, Sweden has a well-established system of governmental commissions to investigate new policies and large-scale socioeconomic and technological programmes. These commissions most often gather scientific and expert opinions on what to do and how to do it, and take scientific opinion into account when making recommendations in the SOU reports. Furthermore, one could point to the policy of sectoral responsibility (see below, pp. 128-32), which mandates central authorities to investigate and assess all their actions and programmes in relation to their effects on the achievement of the 15 NEOs (see above, pp. 65-7). Since these national environmental objectives are operationalised into interim targets and sectoral objectives, citizens and their representatives have a fair chance to judge scientific assessments and disputes over programme effects and goal achievement. Even where knowledge would really matter, money and prestige count.
This leads us to the so far less shown card in the science-policy game. The intensified programme of environmental and resource monitoring, and the envisaged system of 'green indicators' (see below, pp. 132-4) may well turn out a trump, both in terms of sustainability and autonomy. As for sustainability, the monitoring programme provides for a continuous and systematic build-up of ecological knowledge to be used in collective decision-making on environment and resource management. Knowledge gained
